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LAW HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES
ILAN WURMAN *

ABSTRACT
A common line of attack against originalists is that lawyers just aren’t
good at doing history. But in his famous book Historians’ Fallacies, David
Hackett Fischer noted that many historians aren’t good at doing history
either: They often fall into one or more of numerous fallacies that he
catalogued in his celebrated and often devastating three-hundred-page book.
This article points out the many ways in which originalists and other legal
historians fall into, but also how they may avoid, some of the same fallacies
committed by the historians whose works made their way into Fischer’s
book. It will then point to corresponding lessons that lawyers-turnedhistorians ought to employ to write better history. The belief is that
lawyers, judges, and legal academics can become good—or at least better—
historians.
Part II confronts two general attacks on the use of history, both of
which challenge the possibility of obtaining relevant and objective
historical knowledge. Part III establishes the importance of investigative
questions and describes fallacies of question-framing that lead originalists
astray. Part IV explores fallacies of factual verification that stem from
reliance on flawed types of evidence. Part V addresses one fallacy of
factual significance—which we shall call the originalist’s fallacy—that
leads some originalists to misunderstand the significance of certain
evidence. Part VI illustrates fallacies of narration, including fallacies of
anachronism and presentism, that too often create fruitless investigations
and provide ahistorical answers. Part VII, although recognizing the
importance of generalization, demonstrates how originalists (and other legal
historians) often generalize improperly.

* Associate, Winston & Strawn LLP. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2013. Thanks to the usual
suspects, and to some new ones: William Baude, Sean Bland, Jud Campbell, Brenner Fissell,
Philip Hamburger, Michael McConnell, Torsten Menge, Brendan Selby, Julie Silverbrook,
Kenneth Young. This article was written when I was clerking for Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whom I also thank for allowing me the time to think and
write about such things.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In his celebrated work, Historians’ Fallacies,1 David Hackett Fischer
catalogued and described over one hundred fallacies common in historical
literature. The aim of Fischer’s book was to help refine the study of history
and not to impugn its relevance or utility. Many scholars have criticized
originalism for demanding historical analysis for which lawyers are simply

1. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES (1970).
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ill equipped; others have criticized originalist scholarship and judicial
opinions for committing various historical errors; and yet others assail
originalism altogether as a method of obtaining its adherents’ preferred
outcomes. As this article will show, many of these attacks are legitimate:
many originalists do in fact commit errors of historical methodology that
should bring their conclusions into doubt. Yet this article demonstrates that
many of these errors commonly appear in all historical literature, whether
originalist or not, and can be avoided with careful practice.
This article will rely on David Hackett Fischer’s definitions to explain
several of the common fallacies that appear in the academic literature and in
judicial opinions. It will survey the works of both originalist academics and
general historians, both liberal and conservative. It aims to provide a kind
of toolkit or guide for originalist lawyers, judges, and academics so they
can more readily identify and remedy these common errors.2 This article
assumes, then, that historical knowledge is relevant for constitutional and
legal analysis and seeks to help lawyers be a bit better at it.3
Before addressing more specific examples of common fallacies and
demonstrating their commission in various originalist articles and judicial
opinions, Part II addresses general attacks on the possibility of historical
knowledge because identifying methodological errors does little good if one
believes that historical knowledge—or at least the relevant historical
knowledge—is impossible to attain. Although tomes can be written on this
debate and academics of several disciplines continue to argue over it, I
would like merely to suggest a few common-sense reasons to think that
historical knowledge is possible and attainable. And, fittingly, David
Hackett Fischer has described certain fallacies that appertain to these issues
as well.
Part III will introduce fallacies of question-framing that originalists
often commit. These fallacies lead originalists astray because they consist
in a failure to ask the right kinds of questions. If, for example, an
originalist investigator begins his historical inquiry by asking whether
sovereign immunity is rooted in common law and defeasible by statute or is
an indefeasible natural law doctrine, he may completely miss alternative
2. Although some historians have challenged parts of Fischer’s work, it remains widely read
and celebrated. That said, Fischer’s authority on these matters should not be taken as self-evident.
I do not think that all of the “fallacies” he describes, for many of which he invented names, are in
fact fallacies. He nonetheless provides a good starting point for a methodological study. Each of
the fallacies discussed here are described in some detail so the reader can decide for himself
whether they are persuasive. The ones selected, in my view, all have merit.
3. Indeed, even non-originalists recognize that history is relevant to non-originalist
constitutional theory. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 650-51, 668-72, 717-19 (2013).
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possibilities such as that sovereign immunity was in fact a doctrine of
personal jurisdiction with other attributes altogether. He will have
committed the fallacy of false dichotomous questions.
Part IV will discuss fallacies of factual verification involving reliance
on flawed types of evidence. The most common fallacy of this sort in the
literature—and it has become rampant in judicial opinions—is the fallacy of
negative proof that consists in declaring that if there is no evidence that X is
the case, then not-X is in fact the case. This fallacy has potentially led to
erroneous conclusions in the anti-commandeering judicial opinions and
literature and has reared its head in numerous other places. This Part will
also devote some attention to the fallacy of the reversible reference that
consists in using evidence for a proposition that, without more, is literally
meaningless because the evidence could also stand for precisely the
opposite proposition.
Part V will then discuss one fallacy of factual significance, which it
will refer to as the originalist’s fallacy, that was unknown to Fischer
because it is only relevant to originalist history. It is the idea that the best
originalist evidence must be culled from before the date of drafting or
ratification of the Constitution or its amendments. This proposition is utter
nonsense, and as trivial as the point may seem, a surprising number of
originalists seem to accept it at least occasionally. Even if originalists
believe that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed at the time of
enactment, that does not mean that the only evidence we can use to
determine that meaning must date from before the enactment. Nor does it
mean that, if such evidence exists, it will be the best evidence.
Part VI illustrates various fallacies of narration, and particularly the
fallacy of anachronism and the fallacy of presentism, a special kind of
anachronism. This fallacy consists in misinterpreting history by ignoring
past threads that have become unfamiliar to the modern world, or which
have become irrelevant to the modern world but which were familiar and
important in the past. There are several examples of this fallacy and other
anachronisms at work, but the history of judicial review is a particularly
important area in which this fallacy may be often committed.
Part VII, finally, describes fallacies of generalization. Although
generalizations are unavoidable and necessary, originalists often improperly
generalize by relying on insufficient statistical samples and on lonely facts,
or by applying double standards to evidence so that inconvenient facts are
unjustifiably explained away.
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II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
For any of the fallacies described here to be of use, one must first be
persuaded that history is useful to begin with for legal analysis. There are
many attacks on the relevance of history, but here I focus on the key
objection that historical knowledge is not objective or is too indeterminate
to be useful. Conveniently, Fischer describes fallacies in his work that may
offer some insight into these objections.
A. THE HISTORICIST CLAIM
The historicist claim consists in the following notion: if we cannot
operate without modern presuppositions, then we can never obtain objective
or useful historical knowledge. The originalist enterprise is therefore
impossible. There are varying degrees of historicism, from the proposition
that historical knowledge may be true and “objective” but only relative to
its particular time and place to the proposition that no objective knowledge
is possible at all.4
G. Edward White has demonstrated this kind of historicism in the
constitutional scholarship of the 1960s–70s. White surveyed the “growing
view of scholars in fields once associated with historico-politics that
properly conducted historical inquiry illuminated only the past and was thus
irrelevant to contemporary social issues.”5 But the knowledge we could
have about the past was still “objectiv[e],” investigated by a “disinterested
. . . scientific investigator.”6 In other words, history can reveal objective
truths, but these “truths” are only objective relative to a time and place; they

4. Defining terms is extremely important. Many legal academics have used the term
“historicist” differently than I use it here. By historicism I mean the school in the philosophy of
history that is opposed to the notion of transcendental truth; all truths and values are relative to
their time and place. For a general introduction to this understanding of historicism, see LEO
STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 9-34 (1953).
I do not use the term as Stephen M. Griffin or Richard Posner, for example, use it. Griffin
has defined historicism as follows: “A historicist perspective focuses on the contexts in which
historical events took place and how those contexts were later changed.” Stephen M. Griffin,
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (2008). Historicism is not simply the
attempt to understand history in context. By definition that is what history is. To say that
originalists are not historicist because they fail to appreciate the contexts of the various pasts is to
distort originalism, as Griffin does, see id., about which I shall have more to say later. See infra
text accompanying note 72.
As for Posner, G. Edward White correctly describes his use of the term historicist as akin to
“historically oriented.” See G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional
Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 490 n.8 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency,
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
573, 574, 593-96 (2000).
5. White, supra note 4, at 506.
6. Id. at 494.
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tell us nothing enduring.7 Historicist legal thinkers in the 1930s–40s,
therefore, “assumed that since the present never duplicated the past, there
was little point in attempting to resolve present legal issues by invoking
principles extracted from a legal source remote in time.”8 Finally, the great
constitutional theorists of the 1960s–70s, such as Alexander Bickel, came
“to realize that the past, in constitutional interpretation as in other fields,
offers no specific answers to specific contemporary problems”; the role of
history was “reduced to demonstrating ‘what one age finds worthy of note
in another.’”9
If historicists are right—and if the constitutional theorists of the 1960s–
70s were right to discount history—then originalism may be unworkable
because it can never obtain answers to its questions as all historical answers
are only relative to their own time and place. This particular version of
historicism, however, is not so lethal to originalism if the originalist
argument is that the objective truths relative to the founders’ time are the
relevant truths today by virtue of their enshrinement in the Constitution.
Paul Brest demonstrates a slight variation on this historicism in his
famous critique of originalism that presents a much greater challenge to
originalism—and with which several modern scholars continue to agree.
He argues that modern lawyers—all modern people, indeed—are unable
truly to understand historical thought because of inescapable modern
presuppositions.
In The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, Brest approvingly quotes Quentin Skinner who made this
observation vis-à-vis political theorists:
[I]t will never in fact be possible simply to study what any given
classical writer has said . . . without bringing to bear some of one’s
own expectations about what he must have been saying
. . . . [T]hese models and preconceptions in terms of which we
unavoidably organize and adjust our perceptions and thoughts will
themselves tend to act as determinants of what we think or
perceive. . . . The perpetual danger, in our attempts to enlarge our

7. That is also how Leo Strauss has described historicism. Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 4, at 16
(“In trying to discover standards which, while being objective, were relative to particular historical
situations, the historical school assigned to historical studies a much greater importance than they
had ever possessed.”).
8. White, supra note 4, at 522.
9. Id. at 566. The progressive notion in historicism may have contributed to the views of
these scholars. See id. at 513-18, 609-14. If history progresses, that is, if mankind’s knowledge
and understanding progress over historical time in the same way that our knowledge of the natural
sciences progress, why should principles of another age have any bearing on modern legal
interpretation? We are much wiser than they were, and so we should not look to the past for an
understanding of present problems.
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historical understanding, is thus that our expectations about what
someone must be saying or doing will themselves determine that
we understand the agent to be doing something which he would
not—or even could not—himself have accepted as an account of
what he was doing.10
Brest then suggests that his reader study specific areas of constitutional
history to see “the problem of doing original history” and the “elusiveness
of the original understanding” because of such presuppositions.11 Mark
Tushnet has made the same criticism.12
Brest concludes that because all historians have presuppositions, the
relevant historical knowledge is therefore impossible. It stems from the
idea that truth is only relative to a particular time and place and therefore
we cannot understand prior truths because our own, different, historical
existences inescapably color everything about our own understandings.
William Nelson has described Brest’s and Tushnet’s view of history in
a way that clarifies nicely the relativist quality of this kind of historicism.13
Their “contextualist” view, along with those of other “critical legal
scholars,” holds that all historical knowledge is merely giving present
10. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 219 (1980) (quoting Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8
HIST. & THEORY 3, 6 (1969)) (brackets and first two sets of ellipses in Brest’s original). Brest
repeats this concern a few pages later, explaining that one need not assume that historical
knowledge is completely impossible to appreciate its indeterminacies; but the point is essentially
the same. Id. at 221-22 (“Even when the interpreter performs the more conventional historian’s
role, one may wonder whether the task is possible. There is a hermeneutic tradition, of which
Hans-Georg Gadamar is the leading modern proponent, which holds that we can never understand
the past in its own terms, free from our prejudices and preconceptions. We are hopelessly
imprisoned in our own world-views; we can shed some preconceptions only to adopt others, with
no reason to believe that they are the conceptions of the different society that we are trying to
understand. One need not embrace this essentially solipsistic view of historical knowledge to
appreciate the indeterminate and contingent nature of the historical understanding that an
originalist historian seeks to achieve.”).
11. Id. at 219.
12. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983) (“The internal critique cuts deeper; it
undermines in several steps the plausibility of interpretivism as a constitutional theory. The first
step is an argument that interpretivism must rest on an account of historical knowledge more
subtle than the naive presumption that past attitudes and intentions are directly accessible to
present understanding. The second step identifies the most plausible such account, the view—
sometimes called hermeneutics—that historical understanding requires an imaginative
transposition of former world views into the categories of our own. The third step is an argument
that such an imaginative transposition implies an ambiguity that is inconsistent with the project of
liberal constitutional theory (and interpretivism). The project of imaginative transposition can be
carried through in a number of different ways, with a number of different results, none of which is
more “correct”‘ than the others. The existence of such an indeterminacy means that
interpretivism, unless it falls back on nonliberal assumptions, cannot constrain judges sufficiently
to carry out the liberal project of avoiding judicial tyranny.”); see also id. at 793-804.
13. William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 1237 (1986).
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meaning to past facts. In this act of translating the past into present
meaning, the historian, “as he renders the past meaningful in the present,
cannot avoid changing its meaning, just as the Egyptologist who translates
hieroglyphics into English through Greek can at best only approximate their
original meaning.”14 The change that the historian begets depends on his
particular point of view. “A contextualist historian selects one historical
interpretation in preference to another on the basis of its consistency with
his own value system or world view, or that of his audience.”15 David
Strauss has made this same point.16
We should notice that these historicisms have a quality of relativism.
Fischer argues that relativist historicism is fallacious because some facts are
simply true from all perspectives.17 Indeed, common sense suggests that
historicism is wrong in at least some obvious circumstances relevant to
originalism. For example, no matter from what perspective one looks at it,
the Eleventh Amendment was intended to overturn Chisolm v. Georgia.
That piece of historical knowledge may not be enough standing alone to
answer any particular question on sovereign immunity, but that piece of
knowledge is relevant to such an inquiry and it is indisputable. Nelson
provides several examples of historical questions relevant to originalists in
which a historicist would be hard-pressed to come up with more than one
answer to the particular question.18 Fischer additionally argues that merely
because all historical knowledge is incomplete does not mean it is false.19
I think, moreover, that a serious question is raised about historicism
because it appears to be self-contradictory: If all knowledge is relative to a
particular time and place, and has no objective value beyond the partial
perspective and presuppositions of the particular individual, then isn’t
historicism itself merely one “perspective” unique to the cultural,
intellectual, and historical context of its proponents? Fischer explains that
“relativists all argued that they and their friends were exempt from
relativism in some degree.”20 As a more prominent political theorist of the
last century has written,
The historicist thesis is . . . exposed to a very obvious difficulty
which cannot be solved but only evaded or obscured by
14. Id. at 1243.
15. Id. at 1244.
16. David Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 137, 140-41. Others have made the same point. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of
Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 91-92 (2010).
17. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 42 n.4.
18. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1257-59.
19. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 42 n.4.
20. Id.
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considerations of a more subtle character. Historicism asserts that
all human thoughts or beliefs are historical, and hence deservedly
destined to perish; but historicism itself is a human thought; hence
historicism can be of only temporary validity, or it cannot be
simply true. To assert the historicist thesis means to doubt it and
thus to transcend it. . . . Historicism thrives on the fact that it
inconsistently exempts itself from its own verdict about all human
thought. The historicist thesis is self-contradictory or absurd. We
cannot see the historical character of “all” thought—that is, of all
thought with the exception of the historicist insight and its
implications—without transcending history, without grasping
something trans-historical.21
There are other common-sense reasons we might think historicism is
not quite right. Consider that we also have different presuppositions from
person to person within a time and place; or within merely a short span of
time; and so forth. We already lose something in translating hieroglyphs to
Greek itself, without yet another intermediating language. To say, then,
that objective historical knowledge is impossible is to say also that all
knowledge is impossible. If that is true, then any other legal method will be
just as arbitrary as an originalist one because it will rely on some other
knowledge that is still subjective.
These preliminary observations are not intended to resolve the debate
over the possibility of historical knowledge. Obviously much more
theoretical work would be necessary. My point here is only that there are a
number of common-sense reasons to assume that historical knowledge is
possible.
B. INDETERMINACY AND THE USES OF HISTORY
With that reasonable assumption made, I would like to turn to a slightly
different inquiry: what if there is no objective historical knowledge of the
kind relevant to legal inquiries? What if our objective historical knowledge
is too indeterminate to provide us with answers to constitutional questions?
David Strauss stresses this point often. Again, I do not intend here to prove
or disprove Strauss—but because his criticism is prominent, I would like to
suggest a few common-sense reasons why his criticism does not seem quite
right.
He has written,

21. STRAUSS, supra note 4, at 24-25.

170

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:161

On the most practical level, it is often impossible to uncover what
the original understandings were: what people thought they were
doing when they adopted the various provisions of the
Constitution. Discovering how people in the past thought about
their world is the task of historians, and there is no reason to think
that lawyers and judges are going to be good at doing that kind of
history—especially when they are dealing with controversial legal
issues that arouse strong sentiments.22
Elsewhere he has written that “the originalist project [is] a particularly
difficult, challenging form of intellectual history and one that often will, to
the honest originalist, turn up the answer ‘I don’t know,’ or ‘there were
various ideas and none clearly prevailed,’ or ‘they were just confused back
then.’”23 “Too often,” he writes, “it will be just too hard to figure out the
answers to the relevant historical questions.”24 Others have made these
criticisms as well, and at least one originalist has written that it is perhaps
the most universal criticism.25
But Strauss’s criticisms hardly seem unique to originalism. Surely it is
true that history is more difficult to do objectively when dealing with
“controversial legal issues that arouse strong sentiments.”26 But many
historical questions are controversial and arouse strong sentiments—the
effects of imperialism, the roots of slavery, the causes of the First World
War—and yet we don’t give up the study of those topics. Surely it’s just as
easy (or hard) to answer a legal history question as it is to answer any other
historical question from the relevant period. To be sure, Strauss’s criticism
might be justified if what he means is that all history suffers from the
problem of incomplete knowledge and indeterminacy, and so using history
is not a good way to solve legal problems.
On this count, we might glean some insight from Fischer. As he
explains,
There are many objective truths to be told about the past—great
and vital truths that are relevant and even urgent to the needs of
mankind. But there is no whole truth to be discovered by a simple
method of induction. Every true historical statement is an answer
to a question which a historian has asked. Not to The Question.
22. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 18 (2010).
23. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 137, 140 (2011).
24. Id.
25. Thomas B. McAffee, Originalism and Indeterminacy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 429,
429 (1996).
26. STRAUSS, supra note 22, at 18.
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Not to questions about everything. But to questions about
something.27
I think there is much truth, and common sense, to this statement. Some
questions may be too broad to be of relevance, for example (and as we shall
revisit later), whether the Constitution is on the whole a “classical liberal”
constitution or a “civic republican” constitution. But critics hardly show
that all or even most questions of relevance to lawyers and constitutional
scholars—for example, the meaning of the words “happen” and “the
Session” in the Vacancies Clause—cannot produce particular and important
truths or at least a circumscribed range of possibly true answers.28
That last point is particularly important. It may be that there is no one
right answer to a constitutional question, but that does not mean history
isn’t useful. If the history can boil down the legal “answer” to two
possibilities, that is worth something. It means the courts cannot (if you are
an originalist) impose a third possibility. One prominent example will
suffice to illustrate: the famous debate between Michael McConnell and
Philip Hamburger over the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. The
debate centered on whether the clause guarantees religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws; for example, whether the clause would require
that generally applicable drug laws provide an exemption for Native
Americans whose religious practices require using peyote.29 That was the
issue, most recently, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.30
The general dispute revolved around the “caveats” or “provisos” in
early state free exercise clauses. McConnell argues that the provisos
generally allowed for free exercise of religion except where the actions
would not be “peaceable” or would disturb the “peace” or “safety” of the
state.31 The implication he draws is that religious objectors could be
exempt from generally applicable state laws,32 and only when their religious
actions would disturb the peace or threaten the safety of the state could such
27. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 5.
28. See, e.g., infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
29. This was the question in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
30. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). Though Hobby Lobby was based on a federal statute, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which Congress passed in order to reinstate Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence as it existed prior to Smith.
31. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1461-62 (1990). Here is an example of one such proviso,
from New York’s 1777 Constitution: “[T]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this
State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this State.” Id. at 1456.
32. Contra the decision in Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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actions be suppressed. As McConnell writes, “[T]he state provisions make
sense only if free exercise envisions religiously compelled exemptions from
at least some generally applicable laws.”33
Hamburger disputes this implication on the ground that “instead of
implying that the right of free exercise was very extensive—that it
permitted peaceable departure from civil law [(McConnell’s position)]—the
caveats stated the conditions upon which religious liberty could be
denied.”34 That is, a proviso “could have been a condition of the
availability of a relatively narrow right of free exercise rather than a
limitation on an otherwise very extensive right.”35 Put differently, the
“right to free exercise” in the state constitutions was not self-defining, and it
could have been understood as a narrow right.
The McConnell-Hamburger disagreement can be useful for
constitutional interpretation in at least two ways. First, it may be that their
debate reveals a range of originalist meaning. Perhaps the Employment
Division v. Smith test eliminating exemptions from generally applicable
laws36 and the prior Sherbert v. Verner test adopting exemptions from
generally applicable laws37 are both plausible interpretations in light of the
originalist history. That is useful insofar as we know that one of these two
rules, or either of them, would be a legitimate interpretation of the text.
Excluding other possibilities does not indicate total failure.
Second, it may be that this debate can still provide us with an answer
depending on the interpretive conventions we employ. For original public
meaning originalists, for instance, perhaps once the text is unclear, we need
only rely on the preponderance of the evidence with respect to the original
public meaning. In that sense, while both Hamburger’s and McConnell’s
versions provide significant evidence for their respective positions, perhaps
one or the other provides a preponderance of the evidence. Or perhaps an
interpretive method that uses the founders’ idea of liquidation—the notion
that the meaning of the text becomes determined by the first courts to
interpret the text in light of particular controversies—can rely on this
debate, too. The argument would go as follows: There is originalist
evidence suggesting one of two plausible meanings. The early cases
suggest that the courts (or the political branches) liquidated the meaning of

33. McConnell, supra note 31, at 1462.
34. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 919 (1992).
35. Id. at 921.
36. Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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the clause in favor of one rule over the other.38 For example, it was unclear
at the time of the founding whether the Ex Post Facto Clause should be
interpreted by its plain meaning to include all retrospective legislation, or
by its technical meaning to include only criminal cases.
Early
interpretations settled on the technical and thus helped to “fix” or
“liquidate” one rule over the other.39
My point thus far has been to suggest some common-sense reasons
why certain academic arguments against the use of history in legal analysis
seem wrong. At least, for purposes of this article, we can safely assume
that historical knowledge is possible and also relevant. We are thus ready
to engage with the thrust of this article: the fallacies historians tend to
commit and how we might avoid them.
III. FALLACIES OF QUESTION-FRAMING
Question-framing is important to any historical inquiry. “A moment’s
reflection,” writes David Hackett Fischer, “should suffice to establish the
simple proposition that every historian, willy-nilly, must begin his research
with a question.”40 A historian cannot simply absorb all facts in existence
before coming to some conclusion. He cannot know what facts are relevant
without first asking a question. He must generally know what he is looking
for. Now, to be sure, our discussion of the historicist fallacy has suggested
that historians have certain presuppositions and assumptions. Everyone
does.
Our inquiry is whether historians can be sufficiently careful to avoid
coloring their investigations with these presuppositions and assumptions.
We thus begin with the more specific fallacy describing the ways in which
originalist historians too often approach questions with the end in mind—a
habit for highly effective people, perhaps, but also for highly ineffective
historians.

38. These early cases did not liquidate the meaning in favor of McConnell’s view. See
McConnell, supra note 31, at 1503-11. The cases opposed to exemptions often contain language
suggesting that exemptions might be available in other contexts, but ultimately only one early case
definitively found a right to an exemption and at least one found definitively the other way. Id. at
1513.
39. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 547
(2003).
40. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 3.
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A. FALLACY OF DECLARATIVE QUESTIONS
The fallacy of declarative questions is a fallacy of question-framing
whereby an historian with a presupposition will prove what he sets out to
prove:
The fallacy of declarative questions consists in confusing an
interrogative with a declarative statement.
It violates a
fundamental rule of empirical question-framing, which requires
that a question must have an open end, which will allow a free and
honest choice, with minimal bias and maximal flexibility. If a
historian goes to his sources with a simple affirmative proposition
that “X was the case,” then he is predisposed to prove it.41
In originalist histories this fallacy is likely committed subconsciously.
It is particularly common in works that attempt to justify a particular
constitutional interpretation with an appeal to the historical, general,
original understanding of the Constitution. Instead of approaching the
question afresh, many constitutional theorists end up supporting their
particular political views. In particular and more subtly, many theorists
tend to support a particular notion of constitutional legitimacy and then
claim that the original meaning happily comports with their particular
notions of legitimacy.42 That’s not to say these legal historians must be
wrong, only that it raises the question of whether their research questions
were properly framed.43
This fallacy was likely committed in Randy Barnett’s Restoring the
Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty.44 His research question is
spelled out early, and it takes something like the following form: The
Constitution must protect natural rights to be legitimate. We must therefore
look to the original Constitution and see if it protects natural rights. He
then looks and discovers that the original Constitution, when properly
understood, does protect natural rights.45 Barnett does not, at least
41. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 24.
42. I have discussed this elsewhere. See Ilan Wurman, The Original Understanding of
Constitutional Legitimacy, 2014 BYU L. REV 819, 819-48 (2014).
43. H. Jefferson Powell also recognized a fallacy of this kind. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 677 (1987) (“If the founders, as you understand them, always
agree with you, it is logically possible that you are in incredible harmony with them. It is
considerably more likely that your reconstruction of their views is being systematically warped by
your personal opinions on constitutional construction.”).
44. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004).
45. More specifically, Barnett argues that a constitution may legitimately bind nonconsenting residents only if their natural rights are protected. Id. at 4 (“I contend that if a
constitution contains adequate procedures to protect these natural rights, it can be legitimate even
if it was not consented to by everyone; and one that lacks adequate procedures to protect natural
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consciously, impose the presumption of liberty on the text in order to make
the Constitution more just; it just so happens that these constitutional
clauses, when given this correct original meaning, are also just, and so the
Constitution is also legitimate and worthy of our obedience. He may be
correct, but readers of history must surely approach such a claim with some
skepticism.
I think a fallacy of this sort also has occurred in the writing of Jack
Balkin. For him, the Constitution can only be legitimate if it allows for
updating constitutional constructions in our time.46 Balkin further claims
that the Framers intended for us continually to change how we interpret the
standards and principles in the text of the Constitution.47 Of course, such a
view runs directly contrary to Barnett’s thesis that the Constitution was
meant primarily to protect individuals from future decision-making by
enshrining their rights—and thus a presumption of liberty—into the
constitutional text. Balkin draws the precise opposite conclusion than does
Barnett from the open-endedness of the Constitution’s grand rights
provisions with respect to the correct constitutional hermeneutic. But both
share at least one thing in common: they begin with a notion of what the
Constitution must say if it is to be legitimate (from their respective points of
view), and they go on to “prove” that the Constitution says precisely that.
Neither began his project with a truly open-ended research question.
B. FALLACY OF FALSE DICHOTOMOUS QUESTIONS (THE EXCLUDED
MIDDLE)
Another specific way in which a historian might not ask the right
question is if he asks a falsely dichotomous one. Fischer singles out this
fallacy for “special condemnation” because it “arises from the abuse of an
exceedingly dangerous conceptual device.”48 Properly understood, a
dichotomy is a division into two parts that are mutually exclusive and
rights is illegitimate even if it was consented to by a majority.”). Barnett then argues that if the
text of the various constitutional provisions is properly understood, it points to interpretations that
may be described as a presumption of liberty. His clearest statement that he is deriving this
presumption from the original meaning comes on page 152, where he writes, “The original
meaning of these nearly lost clauses [—Necessary & Proper, Privileges or Immunities, and the
Ninth Amendment—] argues strongly against a presumption of constitutionality and in favor of
the contrary construction I describe in chapter 10: the Presumption of Liberty.” Id. at 152. This
presumption also best protects the people’s natural rights by putting the burden on the government
to justify that every action it takes is both “necessary and proper.” Id. at 260.
46. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4, 55, 69-73 (2011).
47. Cf. id. at 25 (“This choice of [vague and abstract] language [of principles] makes little
sense if the purpose of constitutionalism is to strongly constrain future decisionmaking.”); see also
id. at 29 (“[Open-ended rights guarantees] are designed to channel and discipline future political
judgment, not forestall it.”). See generally id. at 21-34.
48. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 9.

176

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:161

collectively exhaustive. A dichotomy “is used incorrectly when a question
is constructed so that it demands a choice between two answers which are
in fact not exclusive or not exhaustive.”49 Nevertheless, says Fischer,
historians often misuse dichotomy. He collects titles from actual (!)
historical works, such as Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat? and Renaissance
Man—Medieval or Modern? along with about two dozen others.50 Perhaps
Plato was somewhat totalitarian and somewhat a democrat. Or perhaps he
was something altogether different; after all, describing him in these terms
is to commit an anachronism, another fallacy to which we come later. But
surely Plato was not solely either a totalitarian or a democrat.
Restoring the Lost Constitution likely commits this fallacy as well. In
making the case for a presumption of liberty, the author describes the battle
over constitutional interpretation as a battle between the presumption of
liberty and its nemesis, the presumption of constitutionality.51 Now of
course many others fall into this trap, too. Indeed, Fischer explains that
many of the examples he cites “reflect a false dichotomy which is deeply
embedded in scholarly literature on the subject at hand.”52 But deeply
embedded or not, why must either be the case? That is, why must the
Constitution either enshrine a presumption of liberty or a presumption of
constitutionality? Casting it as either one or the other ignores the
possibility that it may be a little of both, or perhaps sometimes one and
sometimes the other, or that maybe these presumptions can be avoided
altogether, or that they are altogether meaningless.53
Judicial opinions are replete with such questions or a least with
statements that describe false dichotomies. Often these will take the form
of erroneous “if-then” propositions or “either-or” propositions; in this form

49. Id. at 10.
50. Id. at 10-11.
51. BARNETT, supra note 44, at 5 (“Finally, I shall show how, when the meaning of these
missing provisions is correctly understood, we can choose properly between two opposing
constructions of the powers the Constitution delegates to government officials: . . . The first of
these is called ‘the presumption of constitutionality.’ . . . The second of these may be called the
Presumption of Liberty. . . .”).
52. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 11.
53. For example, as I have written elsewhere, the Founders understood constitutional
legitimacy in such a way that suggests they made compromises among the ends of government,
and therefore it may be difficult to discern which presumption is more consonant with original
meaning. See Wurman, supra note 42, at 848-49, 864-65. McGinnis and Rappaport claim that by
using original interpretive conventions we can avoid using any sort of presumption in
constitutional construction. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 751 (2009).
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the fallacy is often called the fallacy of the excluded middle.54 The dissent
in Alden v. Maine55 seems to have committed this error numerous times.
The majority argued that Chisolm v. Georgia,56 the ruling of which was
overturned by the Eleventh Amendment, was wrong, and therefore the
principles of sovereign immunity extend beyond the diversity cases
described in the Eleventh Amendment.57 The dissent responded, “[I]f the
Court’s current reasoning is correct, the Eleventh Amendment itself was
unnecessary.”58 That statement excludes several middles. As the majority
itself explained, the Amendment was at least necessary to overrule
Caleb Nelson has further explained that the Eleventh
Chisolm.59
Amendment would have allowed dismissal of suits pending against any
state that may have already been compelled to appear and also protected
states that waived sovereign immunity in their own courts from having to
appear in federal court on the basis of removal jurisdiction.60
The dissent again committed the fallacy of false dichotomous questions
when it set up its inquiry by seeking to determine whether sovereign
immunity was, at the time of the founding, considered: (1) a common law
power understood to be defeasible by statute or (2) whether it was
considered a natural law concept whereby a sovereign could not be
logically bound to the law it made.61 It turns out that neither of these two
conceptions was likely how the founders viewed sovereign immunity.
Caleb Nelson again shows that sovereign immunity was not a natural law
doctrine or a common law power defeasible by statute, but rather it was
more likely a doctrine of personal jurisdiction whereby a sovereign could
not be sued because there was no way to compel the sovereign’s attendance
by civil process—and therefore courts would not have the power to enter a
judgment because no “case” or “controversy” would have formed.62 The
lesson of all of these examples is that it is very difficult to obtain correct
historical answers when the initial question being answered is flawed by its
exclusion ab initio of plausible routes of inquiry.

54. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to
Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 367 (1994); William Ewald, Unger’s Philosophy: A Critical
Legal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665, 756 n.117 (1988).
55. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
56. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
57. Alden, 527 U.S. at 721-22.
58. Id. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 723.
60. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1559, 1603-06 (2002).
61. Alden, 527 U.S. at 762-64 (Souter, J., dissenting).
62. Nelson, supra note 60, at 1567-1608.
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We must conclude this particular discussion with an example from an
amicus brief before the Supreme Court in the Second Amendment case,
District of Columbia v. Heller.63 The brief was written by a group of
professional historians—all of whom “earned Ph.D. degrees in history,
hold academic appointments in university departments of history, and
specialize in the American Revolution, the Early Republic, American Legal
History, American Constitutional History, Anglo-American Legal History,
or related areas.”64 They drew attention to historians’ recurring complaint
about the shortcomings of “law office history.”65 And they, incredibly,
committed at least one major fallacy of question-framing, as well as a
handful of other fallacies that we shall encounter in the coming Parts.
The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”66 Our professional historians frame the
question as follows:
As a problem for constitutional historians, the question can be
elaborated and restated this way: Did the framers and ratifiers of
the Amendment believe they were constitutionally entrenching an
individual right to keep arms for personal protection? Or did they
conceive the Amendment to achieve a different end, by affirming
that a “well-regulated militia” of citizen-soldiers would preserve
“the security of a free state,” principally by lessening the need for
a republican government to depend on a standing army?67
The Second Amendment, however, makes reference both to a right of
the people to bear arms and to a well-regulated militia. By improperly
framing the question as a false dichotomy, these professional historians ab
initio missed the possibility—and therefore the evidence they sought
naturally led them away from that possibility—that a well-regulated militia
was to be maintained by protecting the people’s right to remain armed and
trained. That, indeed, appears to be the conclusion adopted by the Supreme
Court in Heller.68
It is important to emphasize that the above is not to say that this third
view is correct, but it is to say that it’s possible that it is correct. By
63. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
64. Brief of Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, District of
Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (Jan. 11, 2008), 2008 WL 157183, at 1 [hereinafter Brief of
Rakove et al.].
65. Id. at 33.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
67. Brief of Rakove et al., supra note 64, at 1-2.
68. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599-600 (2008).
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improperly framing the question, however, the professional historians
closed themselves off to its possibility. Law-office historians, it would
seem, do no worse than their colleagues on the opposite side of their
university campuses.
C. FALLACY OF QUIBBLING
The fallacy of quibbling is listed in Fischer’s book under the category
“fallacies of semantical distortion”69 but fits here as well. It is “a form of
equivocation which involves two or more people in a single argumentative
exchange”; “[i]t occurs whenever the meaning of a term is changed as it
changes hands, with a resultant argumentative distortion.”70 For example,
Fischer explains how Max Weber’s famous thesis of “a functional
relationship between capitalism and the Protestant ethic rested upon a
careful definition of these terms”; an opponent, however, “subtly shifted
those definitions in his attempt at refutation.”71 This is a question-framing
problem because it distorts the components of a prior scholar’s question.
At a high level of generality, this fallacy occurs in the debates over
originalism, when the opponents of it distort the thought of originalists in
order to refute them. This occurs in Stephen M. Griffin’s Rebooting
Originalism, where he argues that originalism depends on a view of history
devoid of historical context.72 No originalist believes, however, that history
can be done without taking historical context into account. Indeed, that is
the only way to do history. Originalists do, as we shall see later, often
commit errors with their evidence, but that is not because they maintain that
historical context is irrelevant.
Similarly, to claim in 2007 that originalism fails because the Founders
did not adhere to the “plain meaning” of legal texts73 is to commit the
fallacy of quibbling because: (1) no originalist seriously believes that legal
texts must be interpreted by their “plain” rather than their “reasonable” or
“contextual” meaning,74 and (2) to understand the “plain” meaning of words
69. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 275.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (2008).
73. See Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian
Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 150 (2007).
74. This includes the originalist, Randy Barnett, on whose definition Cornell relied. Id.
Barnett defines originalism as seeking to discover the “objective original meaning that a
reasonable listener would have placed on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time
of its enactment.” Id. at 150 (quoting Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45
LOY. L. REV. 611, 620, 621 (1999)). An “objective” meaning to a “reasonable” observer may not
be, and probably would not be, the “plain meaning” devoid of any legal background or linguistic
context.
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one often has to look at context—claiming otherwise would be
preposterous. In other words, the author who claims “there is good reason
to doubt that plain-meaning originalism is a historically accurate reflection
of how many contemporaries would have interpreted the Constitution”
because those contemporaries had a “deeply contextualist … approach” to
constitutionalism,75 commits the fallacy of quibbling both by redefining
originalism and by redefining plain meaning.
Changing the terms to defeat an opponent is generally a common
practice, not just in historical arguments; but the latter of our two examples
is also important for a crucial historical inquiry. If in seeking to discover
whether the Founders were originalists—and therefore whether or not
originalism is a self-defeating proposition—we change the definition of
“originalism,” our historical analysis will be of doubtful utility. As Fischer
observes, the historian will have disproved a thesis—in our case, that the
Founders were plain-meaning interpreters of legal texts—but not the thesis
he claims to have disproved.76
IV. FALLACIES OF FACTUAL VERIFICATION
Fallacies of factual verification involve the types of evidence historians
use to try to prove the truthfulness of a fact. Sometimes the evidence does
not actually prove what the historian seeks to prove. This error occurs in
certain patterns that can be described as fallacies, of which this part
analyzes only a few. The most common one in the originalist literature is
the fallacy of negative proof—the notion that an absence of evidence of
something is itself affirmative evidence that something did not or could not
exist.
A. FALLACY OF NEGATIVE PROOF
“The fallacy of negative proof is an attempt to sustain a factual
proposition merely by negative evidence. It occurs whenever a historian
declares that ‘there is no evidence that X is the case,’ and then proceeds to
affirm or assume that not-X is the case.”77 H. Jefferson Powell warned of
something similar when he instructed originalists not to use “silence” as
evidence of historical understanding,78 though using silence as evidence
may not always commit the fallacy of negative proof.79
75. Id. at 151.
76. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 275.
77. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 47.
78. Powell, supra note 43, at 671-72.
79. If, for example, a particular power were an attractive power, an absence of any use of
that power might suggest that it did not exist. The problem, however, is usually in the premise—
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Notwithstanding Powell’s early admonition, the fallacy of negative
proof has been committed in a number of important contexts, the anticommandeering literature and judicial opinions being of particular note. In
Printz v. United States,80 this fallacy rears its head several times. Justice
Scalia writes for the Court that contemporaneous legislative exposition of
the Constitution is strong affirmative evidence of the original meaning of
the constitutional text.81 He then writes: “Indeed, it can be argued that the
numerousness of these statutes [imposing obligations on state courts],
contrasted with the utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’
executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress),
suggests an assumed absence of such power.”82 That statement commits
the fallacy of negative proof. Use of a power is evidence of the existence of
that power; claiming that there is no evidence of use is tantamount to
claiming that there is no evidence of the power. The Court’s proposition
thus takes the form “there is no evidence of X, therefore not-X must be the
case.” The Court repeats this same proposition at other points in the
opinion.83
Justice Scalia’s reliance on an absence of evidence, to be sure, is not a
perfect example of the fallacy of negative proof because it does provide us
with some important evidence. Specifically, Justice Scalia explains that if
the power did exist, it would have been an attractive power to use and
therefore we might suppose that it would have been used.84 We shall see
shortly that this assumption was likely wrong and there is another
explanation for why the federal government may not have used this power.
But we should note that if the assumption is correct, then demonstrating an
absence of evidence would be some proof that the power did not exist.
Both the majority and the dissent commit a more complete version of
this fallacy when they make too much of the circumstances surrounding
President Wilson’s “requesting” rather than demanding the states’ aid in
implementing the draft. The majority takes Wilson’s posture to mean that
thinking that something would have been an attractive power, or that something would have been
said if people thought it, and so on. Those are often faulty assumptions, which goes to show the
danger of silence generally, even if using silence as evidence is not always negative proof. See
infra pp. 181-83 (discussing the anti-commandeering opinions).
80. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
81. Id. at 905.
82. Id. at 907-08 (emphasis removed).
83. Id. at 916 (“To complete the historical record, we must note that there is not only an
absence of executive-commandeering statutes in the early Congresses, but there is an absence of
them in our later history as well . . . .”).
84. “Conversely if . . . earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power [of the
commandeering of state officers to enforce federal laws], we would have reason to believe that the
power was thought not to exist.” Id. at 905.
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he believed it necessary to request rather than to commandeer the state
officers, evidence that commandeering is unconstitutional.85 But there
could be any number of political reasons to request rather than to
commandeer. The absence of the power’s use does not mean the power did
not exist. The dissent, for its part, writes: “If there were merit to the
Court’s appraisal of this incident, one would assume that there would have
been some contemporary comment on the supposed constitutional concern
that hypothetically might have motivated the President’s choice of
language.”86 That there was no evidence of Wilson having been concerned
about the constitutionality of commandeering does not mean that Wilson
was not concerned about the constitutionality of commandeering. To say
otherwise is to commit the fallacy of negative proof. It cannot be stressed
enough how common this faulty mode of reasoning has become in judicial
opinions. It has become almost second nature.
One anti-commandeering scholar committed this same fallacy when,
discussing the commandeering of state courts, he wrote: “[G]iven that the
Anti-Federalists’ real and imagined fears for the loss of state autonomy
were easily aroused, the absence of any outcry from them concerning the
prospect of jurisdictional (or other) coercion, is itself strong evidence that
such a prospect was not part of the perceived message of The Federalist.”87
In other words, there is no evidence of X (the existence of the power would
be evinced by an outcry against it), and therefore not-X (the power does not
exist).
But there might be another explanation for both the absence of the
outcry and the absence of any historical use. First, suppose there was no
outcry because the Anti-Federalists wanted the federal government to
commandeer state officials because they feared a federal bureaucracy above
all. Second, suppose that the Federalists reassured the Anti-Federalists that
the federal government would use state officials to execute federal laws to
assuage their concerns. But then suppose the Federalists took power early
in the republic and decided to create a federal bureaucracy after all in a kind
of bait-and-switch. There would be no evidence of early historical use
because the Federalists did not want to use the state officials when it could
create a federal bureaucracy, whose officers would have federal
attachments, instead. That, indeed, is the narrative put forward by Wesley J.
Campbell in his Yale Law Journal article, Commandeering and

85. Id. at 917.
86. Id. at 953 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 142.
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Constitutional Change.88 Although his evidence is not unequivocal, it is
strikingly persuasive.89
Having assailed significant portions of the conservative Justices’
historical analysis in Printz, the liberal Justices’ historical analysis in
another federalism context—sovereign immunity—must be challenged as
well. We need only revisit Alden v. Maine, where the dissenters committed
the fallacy of negative proof repeatedly. The dissenters at one point write,
“There is no evidence . . . that any concept of inherent sovereign immunity
was understood historically to apply when the sovereign sued was not the
font of the law.”90 Elsewhere the dissenters point to the “fact” that “no
State declared that sovereign immunity” was an “inalienable and natural
right[]” as evidence that sovereign immunity was not so considered.91 As
we have discussed earlier, however, Caleb Nelson offers a treasure trove of
affirmative evidence demonstrating that the founding generation
overwhelmingly considered sovereign immunity to be a doctrine of
personal jurisdiction—which would make irrelevant which sovereign was
the font of the law.92
Negative proof is not constrained to federalism decisions. Campbell
again shows how Justice Scalia’s concluding statement in his City of
Boerne93 concurrence, again on the free exercise issue, commits this fallacy.
Scalia had written:
88. Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104
(2013).
89. Campbell’s discussion of the impost debates proves that the anti-federalists would have
preferred that state officers execute federal laws, but it does not prove that the Constitution
permitted commandeering of state officials without state consent. See id. at 1112-26. In the
ratification debates, Hamilton tried to assuage the anti-federalists by claiming the federal
government would “make use of” or would “employ” state officials to execute federal law. Id. at
1129-30. It still does not follow that the Constitution permitted commandeering. Campbell makes
the strongest case from this part of the evidence as follows: “During the impost controversy,
defenders of state autonomy had insisted that hiring federal collectors posed a greater threat to
state sovereignty than commandeering state collectors. With the impost controversy coloring the
entire debate, it was unnecessary for Federalists to explain that state officers would be compelled
to enforce federal law. And surely contemporaries would not have thought that Federalist silence
signaled a tacit denial of federal commandeering power.” Id. at 1132-33.
Campbell offers more direct evidence that a federal commandeering power was contemplated
in his discussion of the Oath Clause, which, he argues, was understood to imply that state officers
would have to enforce federal laws, id. at 1134-35, and of the debate over posse comitatus, in
which the Federalists suggested that the greater power to call forth the state militias included the
lesser powers to call upon the civil authority—the county sheriff and his posse of local citizens—
to enforce the federal laws, id. at 1140-41. For his discussion of the Federalist bait-and-switch
and the Anti-Federalists’ political blunders that contributed to it, see id. at 1144-48, 1153-57,
1166.
90. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 772.
92. Nelson, supra note 60, at 1567-1608.
93. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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It seems to me that the most telling point made by the dissent is to
be found, not in what it says, but in what it fails to say. Had the
understanding in the period surrounding the ratification of the Bill
of Rights been that the various forms of accommodation discussed
by the dissent were constitutionally required (either by State
Constitutions or by the Federal Constitution), it would be
surprising not to find a single state or federal case refusing to
enforce a generally applicable statute because of its failure to make
accommodation.
Yet the dissent cites none—and to my
knowledge, and to the knowledge of the academic defenders of the
dissent’s position, none exists.94
But Campbell shows that the dearth of cases is explained far more by a
skepticism toward claims of religious belief in the first place (and hence
there would be no need for any accommodation), rather than a view that
there should be no such accommodations for genuinely religious beliefs.95
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the
Noel Canning v. NLRB96 decision also relied (though only partly) on the
absence of historical practice in deciding whether the President could fill a
vacancy during an intra-session recess rather than “the Recess” in between
official sessions of the Senate (known as the inter-session recess). The
court emphasized the importance of early congressional practice: “The
interpretation of the [Recess Appointments] Clause in the years
immediately following the Constitution’s ratification is the most instructive
historical analysis in discerning the original meaning.”97 The court then
noted that there was a striking absence of appointments during intra-session
recesses.98 The problem, however, is that intra-session recesses of the kind
that occur today were extremely rare in the early republic. As the court
recognized, “it is true that intrasession recesses of significant length may
have been far less common in those early days than today.”99 Yet the court
nonetheless proceeded to declare that it is still “the case that the
appointment practices of Presidents more nearly contemporaneous with the

94. Id. at 542.
95. Wesley J. Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth-Century Religious Exemption
Cases, 63 STAN. L. REV. 973, 976 (2011).
96. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861
(U.S. 2013).
97. Id. at 501.
98. Id. (“The available evidence shows that no President attempted to make an intrasession
recess appointment for 80 years after the Constitution was ratified.”).
99. Id. at 502.
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adoption of the Constitution do not support the propriety of intrasession
recess appointments.”100
This conclusion does not seem correct. The historical evidence may
tell us nothing at all one way or the other; but it surely does not tell us that
an act undertaken in a given condition is unconstitutional because it was not
exercised under that condition in early congressional history, if that
condition simply did not exist in that early history. To be sure, if the
historical evidence demonstrated that there were an equal number of
intrasession recesses and intersession recesses but that recess appointments
only occurred during the latter, that would be much stronger evidence that
the power was thought not to exist. It would still be negative proof and we
would have to be careful in using it—but it would be better negative proof
than that used by the Noel Canning court.
Fortunately, the Noel Canning decision also points to the kind of
affirmative historical evidence that lawyers and historians can and should
use. The court astutely noted that President George Washington seemed to
understand the clause to require that the vacancy itself arise during a recess:
If not enough time remained in the session to ask a person to serve
in an office, President Washington would nominate a person
without the nominee’s consent, and the Senate would confirm the
individual before recessing. Then, if the person declined to serve
during the recess, thereby creating a new vacancy during the
recess, President Washington would fill the position using his
recess appointment power.101
The court provided additional historical evidence from the writings of
Edmund Randolph and Alexander Hamilton.102 It might be objected that
this affirmative evidence is just the other side of the same coin: There was
no evidence that George Washington did X (because he in fact did Y), and
therefore not-X. But that is not quite the same thing. The evidence that
Washington did Y suggests that he thought Y was the case, providing us
with affirmative proof that Y perhaps was the case.
We might illustrate with another example of affirmative historical
evidence. Robert Natelson has quite exhaustively looked at uses of the term
“the Recess” in founding-era writings and concludes that the term always
referred to the gap between formal sessions of the legislature, although the

100. Id.
101. Id. at 508 (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 508-09.
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word recess could itself refer to any time the legislature was not sitting.103
His evidence demonstrates that the words most likely would not have
allowed the President to make appointments without the advice and consent
of the Senate if the Senate was not in an actual, intersession Recess. This is
evidence that Y is the case, i.e., that the word was used in some particular
way, which is not the same thing as saying the word was not used in some
other way and therefore that other way is not the case.
The fallacy of negative proof does not occur only in judicial opinions.
Our previously introduced group of professional historians commit this
fallacy in the amicus brief they wrote for the Supreme Court’s consideration
in D.C. v. Heller. They argued that “[e]xplicit Anti-Federalist references to
a private right to arms were conspicuously few in number and failed to
generate political support” was evidence that an individual right to bear
arms did not exist.104 They emphasize this negative proof repeatedly in
their brief.105 The irony serves to remind us that all historians, whether
lawyers-turned-historians or professional historians, are prone to commit
methodological errors.
In the above example, the negative proof may seem powerful
juxtaposed with the affirmative proof that the populace at the time spoke
commonly of the right in the context of militias. But that does not make the
negative proof anymore real proof. It could easily be the case—and the
professional historians’ own primary sources seem to suggest as much—
that many if not most individuals owned arms for self-defense and
recreational activities and saw no need to state an uncontroversial
proposition. As the historians themselves write, gun “ownership and use
were not major issues in eighteenth-century America.”106 Ironically, the
authors rely on a sarcastic statement by Noah Webster in response to AntiFederalist requests that a private right to bear arms be protected. He had
asked why not add to the proposed prohibition on infringing the right to
bear arms the following: “That Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant
of America from eating and drinking, at seasonable times, or prevent his
103. Robert G. Natelson, The Origins and Meaning of “Vacancies that May Happen During
the Recess” in the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199,
213-27. It should be noted that the majority in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning,
134 S.Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014), stated that the word “recess” was ambiguous but relied on dictionary
definitions and other usages, not on its use with respect to parliamentary procedure.
104. Brief of Rakove et al., supra note 64, at 22.
105. Id. at 10 & n.2 (“It is noteworthy that no [early state rights declarations] made any
reference to the private ownership and personal use of firearms.”); id. at 17 (“Lee identified a
number of fundamental rights deserving recognition, but said nothing about firearms.”); id. at 22
(“In contrast to the numerous discussions of the militia during the ratification debates, explicit
references to the private ownership of firearms were few and scattered.”).
106. Id. at 12.
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lying on his left side, in a long winter’s night, or even on his back, when he
is fatigued by lying on his right.”107 But this shows just how ludicrous was
the idea that the government would ever infringe on the people’s rights to
bear arms, which is why there was only limited discussion of the issue.
That the discussion was limited therefore gives us very little indication of
whether this right was ultimately protected by the text of the Amendment.
B. FALLACY OF REVERSIBLE REFERENCE
Fischer defines reversible reference as “a chameleonlike statement
which changes its color with its context and which might variously be used
to prove the proposition that X is the case or that not-X is the case, as the
author wishes.”108 It is the use of evidence to prove a proposition when
precisely the opposite proposition might also adequately explain the same
evidence. Fischer provides a rather humorous example from Carl
Bridenbaugh’s book Cities in the Wilderness.
To support the proposition that “[c]asting rubbish and refuse of all
kinds into the streets without let or hindrance was a confirmed habit of both
English and American town-dwellers”—that is, that colonial towns were
filthy and strewn with trash—Bridenbaugh offered three pieces of
evidence.109 They were: “that a law was passed against littering in New
Amsterdam in 1657, that the law was enforced upon an early American
litterbug named John Sharp in 1671, and that provision was made in 1670
for weekly trash removal by the car men of the city.”110 We immediately
see the problem. Each of these pieces of evidence can be consistent with
either the proposition that colonial American streets were strewn with trash
or the opposite proposition—that colonial American streets were kept clean
due precisely to these laws and regulations.111 Fischer points out,
importantly, that the evidence can also be consistent with any position
between these two opposites.112
There are many straightforward examples of this fallacy. We must
harp once more on the dissenting opinion in Alden v. Maine. At one point,
the dissent offers evidence that “[s]everal colonial charters . . . expressly
specified that the corporate body established thereunder could sue and be
sued” for the proposition that “[t]he American Colonies did not enjoy

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 24.
FISCHER, supra note 1, at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.

188

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:161

sovereign immunity.”113 Yet this is a reversible reference; it is literally
meaningless. It can stand for the stated proposition, or it can stand for
precisely the opposite proposition that the American Colonies did enjoy
sovereign immunity which is why some colonies had to abrogate sovereign
immunity or expressly consent to suit in their charters.
Our professional historians’ use of the fallacy of negative proof also
seems to commit the fallacy of the reversible reference. To recapitulate,
these historians argued from the fact that “references to the keeping of
firearms are so few and terse” that the individual’s right to bear arms was a
“minor . . . question,” and therefore that the Second Amendment’s
preamble, which has to do with the hotly debated issue of militias, is the
“true guide to its original meaning.”114 Yet this absence of historical
evidence can also be proof of precisely the opposite proposition: that the
individual’s right to bear arms was unflinchingly accepted and
uncontroversial (recall Noah Webster’s sarcasm to this effect), and
therefore it is unremarkable that the Framers of the Second Amendment
protected this individual right.
Finally, we can point to an instance in the debate between Michael
McConnell and Philip Hamburger over the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause in which this fallacy was perhaps just barely averted.115 McConnell
relies at one point on James Madison’s insistence on including a religious
exemption to the militia clause in the Federal Constitution as evidence “that
Madison believed freedom of religion to include exemption from generally
applicable laws in some circumstances.”116 As Philip Hamburger criticized,
however, “Yet other conclusions at least as probable as McConnell’s can be
drawn from Madison’s proposal of a military exemption: For example,
Madison may have assumed that a conscience or free exercise clause would
not provide any right of exemption.”117 After all, if the Free Exercise
Clause already provided such exemptions as McConnell would like for us
to believe, why would Madison need to include one in the militia clause?
One does not commit a fallacy of reversible reference if one
acknowledges that a contrary interpretation is possible and attempts to
support one particular interpretation with good arguments. McConnell
averts committing the fallacy because he examines the debates in more
depth and offers reasons why Madison’s position may still have been

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 764 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Brief of Rakove et al., supra note 64, at 4.
Hamburger, supra note 34; McConnell, supra note 31.
McConnell, supra note 31, at 1454.
Hamburger, supra note 34, at 927.
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consistent with a general exemption in the Free Exercise Clause.118 For
example, the Free Exercise Clause applies to the federal government, but
the militias are controlled by the states; or perhaps the Framers intended
more firmly to ensure exemptions in military matters; or perhaps they
worried that leaving out an exemption would be construed as evidence that
no exemptions for free exercise were ever contemplated.119
Explaining, as McConnell does, why an alternative explanation for the
evidence can be rejected is absolutely necessary for avoiding the fallacy of
reversible reference. McConnell narrowed his claim in his first reference to
the militia clause debate by stating that it will reveal that Madison believed
in exemptions “in some circumstances.”120 He must temper his ultimate
claim as well, and he thus concludes that the exemption discussion in the
militia clause debates “strongly suggests that the general idea of free
exercise exemptions was part of the legal culture.”121
V. FALLACIES OF FACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE
Generally, fallacies of factual significance are errors in the selection of
facts important to a particular question.122 For example, Fischer describes
the “prodigious fallacy” as “mistak[ing] sensation for significance”; it is the
erroneous idea that historians must describe the rare and spectacular rather
than the mundane and common.123 If one agrees that what he describes is
indeed a fallacy (I’m not convinced that it always must be), then it is a
fallacy of factual significance because it suggests that historians are
drawing conclusions from insignificant evidence. What I call the
originalist’s fallacy would fall under Fischer’s larger category of fallacies of
factual significance.124
The originalist’s fallacy is the notion that we must look only to
evidence from before the enactment of a constitutional provision to
understand its meaning. Professors Calabresi and Prakash adhere to a
version of this idea: “[E]ven after having demonstrated a textual
ambiguity,” they write, “no originalist should rely exclusively upon the
Constitution’s postenactment ‘legislative’ history, which is, after all, the
history that is least likely to reflect the original understanding. It is better to
118. McConnell, supra note 31, at 1501.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1454.
121. Id. at 1501 (emphasis added).
122. Cf. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 64.
123. Id. at 70-71.
124. See id. at 64-100. I hesitate to describe any of the other fallacies which fall into this
category because Fischer may have overstated the fallaciousness of quite a few of the techniques
and modes of argument he described. Others are also difficult to detect.
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examine exhaustively the pre-ratification material first and only look at the
post-ratification material if it is absolutely necessary to do so.”125 (When
understood against the article to which they were responding, as I shall
explain shortly, I think their view may not ultimately be inconsistent with
the view I espouse here.126) Another scholar has written, “[A]s a
methodological matter, it seems somewhat strange for originalists to prefer
post-ratification materials with concrete implications for winners and losers
over pre-ratification materials.”127 This notion seems to follow naturally
from the idea that the text’s meaning is “fixed” at the time of enactment.128
Philip Hamburger may have adhered to this view in his response to
Michael McConnell on free exercise when Hamburger ignored the evidence
from the earliest judicial opinions. “Although interesting,” writes
Hamburger, the evidence from nineteenth-century judicial opinions is “only
indirectly pertinent to the question of what late eighteenth-century
Americans thought about exemptions.”129 Hamburger focuses on preenactment evidence.
McConnell, however, surveyed state cases from as early as 1813.130 It
is of course possible (and maybe even probable) that the court did not
understand the free exercise of religion in the state constitution as the
framers of the New York constitution would have understood it thirty-five
years earlier,131 but as the first case interpreting it and only a generation
removed from the framing surely this evidence is worth some, if not
significant, weight. If the evidence from the eighteenth-century was
overwhelmingly contrary, then perhaps these early cases can be dismissed;
but if the evidence is not overwhelmingly to the contrary, surely the postenactment nature of the judicial opinions—which will always be postenactment—does not inherently undermine its worth.132

125. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550-51 (1994).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 141-143
127. Jeremy D. Bailey, The Traditional View of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77 and an
Unexpected Challenge: A Response to Seth Barrett Tillman, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169,
171 (2010).
128. For a general discussion, see Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2-4 (Illinois
Public Law Research Paper No. 07-24), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120244.
129. Hamburger, supra note 34, at 917 n.8.
130. McConnell, supra note 31, at 1504 (citing and discussing People v. Philips, Court of
General Sessions, City of New York (June 14, 1813)).
131. The state constitution was framed in 1777. See id. at 1411, n.2; Hamburger, supra note
34, at 924.
132. A thirty-five-year gap may, however, be too long for the opinion to have much worth.
McConnell does recognize that these opinions have less weight the farther in time they are from
the framings. McConnell, supra note 31, at 1513 (“None of these decisions was handed down
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One more recent and explicit example of this fallacy appears in an
article on the Recess Appointments Clause.133 The author writes,
The disadvantages of omitting preratification material should be
obvious. Statements and practices arising after the ratification
may not have been part of the ratifiers’ original understanding.
When postratification sources do shed light back into the tunnel of
time, that light is usually weak and uncertain. Even statements by
people who participated in the constitutional debates, such as
Edmund Randolph, Alexander Hamilton, and Christopher Gore,
are of limited value if made after the Constitution was already law.
Memories fade and incentives change. Thus, the best evidence of
the original force of the unamended Constitution comes from
sources arising before the thirteenth state, Rhode Island, ratified
the document on May 29, 1790.134
But why? It is not at all obvious that pre-enactment evidence is any
better than post-enactment evidence. If one source expounding on the
meaning of a constitutional provision is dated May 28, 1790, is it really of
more force than a different source dated May 30, 1790, expounding on the
same provision? Surely not. Perhaps an improved test, then, would be to
use that evidence which is nearest in time to enactment whether it dates
from before or after the event. Indeed, that seems to be the standard that
Fischer provides and which he calls the rule of “immediacy”:
[A]n historian must not merely provide good relevant evidence but
the best relevant evidence. And the best relevant evidence, all
things being equal, is evidence which is most nearly immediate to
the event itself. The very best evidence, of course, is the event
itself, and then the authentic remains of the event, and then direct
observations, etc.135
Other considerations, such as motive and incentive, also come into
play. But although incentives surely change over time, and perhaps
immediately post-enactment, incentives must always be taken into account
in assessing the worth of any material, whether pre- or post-enactment.
What the Federalists were assuring the public about the Constitution’s
meaning before ratification ought to carry more weight than what the AntiFederalists were accusing it of meaning. Although both sides may have had
within twenty years of the first amendment, and they are therefore weak indicators of the original
understanding.”).
133. Natelson, supra note 103.
134. Id. at 204-05.
135. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 62.
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motives to distort, the Anti-Federalists, who opposed the Constitution, had
more motive to exaggerate. But after ratification it may very well be that
the motives of the Federalists changed. Now they had their Constitution;
perhaps all those assurances they gave did not need to be adhered to
anymore.136
We have already seen that something of this sort may have occurred
with the discussions over commandeering of state officials: The Federalists
assured the Anti-Federalists that state officers would or at least could have
the responsibility to implement federal programs. When the Federalists
won the initial elections, however, they decided to create a federal
bureaucracy to implement such programs. The post-enactment actions of
the Federalists may therefore carry less weight than their pre-enactment
assurances. Therefore, an even better test for good evidence would be
nearest in time with least motive to distort.
Kesavan and Paulsen offer another plausible test for the use of both
pre-enactment and post-enactment history: “Post-Founding evidence is
probative of original linguistic meaning and should be consulted even when
the Founding-era evidence is seemingly unambiguous. . . . [E]vidence from
even a lower-priority category of second-best evidence of constitutional
meaning may reinforce (or undermine) conclusions derived from a higherpriority category of second-best evidence of constitutional meaning.”137 In
other words, consistent post-enactment evidence might support, amplify,
and clarify our pre-enactment evidence.
Just as useful, however, is post-enactment evidence that seems to offer
another interpretation of the pre-enactment evidence. It may lead us to
question our interpretation of the pre-enactment evidence. Consider
Chisolm v. Georgia.138 Although as we have seen there was pre-ratification
evidence that the text of Article III left sovereign immunity intact—because
“cases” or “controversies” could not form without personal jurisdiction over
the states139—it clearly was not obvious to everyone, including four out of

136. I should like to be clear on this point. Even if the Federalists had motive to sugarcoat
certain aspects of the Constitution to achieve ratification, if the Federalists and Anti-Federalists
came to agree that that sugarcoated interpretation was the one everyone was enacting, that
interpretation is perhaps the most plausible in terms of historical understanding. In other words,
even if the Federalists didn’t really believe what they were saying, taking them at their word
would have interpretive value. In any event, the point is only that incentives to distort exist both
before and after an event, even if the nature of the incentives—or the distortions—might change.
137. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1182 (2003).
138. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
139. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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five Supreme Court justices, that the Constitution left it intact.140 The
popular reaction against Chisolm, which was decided only a few years after
the founding, might tell us a lot about how the people understood the words
of Article III. It is quite plausible to argue that the uproar over Chisolm
reflected general disagreement with its conclusion; this evidence is not
inherently suspect merely because it arises after ratification.
The point is that there is no necessary connection between a change in
time and a change in motive. Barring a persuasive explanation as to why
the Ratification itself might have affected the public’s use of the word
“happen,” or its understanding of “sovereign immunity,” there is no logical
reason to give more evidentiary weight pre-1789 than to post-1789
evidence so long as the absolute temporal distance is about the same.
Let us conclude by revisiting what Calabresi and Prakash said.141 They
disavowed post-enactment legislative history because they felt their
adversaries in the debate over the unitary executive had used such history to
create ambiguity in the text.142 Lessig and Sunstein, they argued, used the
statutes enacted by the first Congress as evidence of how they understood
their power to structure the executive branch; but Congress was an
institutional rival of the President, and hence their post-enactment view of
presidential power is unreliable.143 I think that is a fair argument to make;
taking that into account is consistent with the rule of immediacy, modified
by incentives to distort. But I also think it would not be unfair to suggest
that the First Congress, perhaps more than any other Congress since, took
seriously the idea that it was left to them to figure out just how this new
Constitution of theirs was to work and what it meant. Indeed, moving
forward a few decades, was Henry Clay’s impassioned plea for the
independence of the Treasury Department only a function of his
institutional interests?144 And even if it was, wasn’t Andrew Jackson’s
contrary view145 merely a function of his institutional interests? I think the
matter is too complicated merely to assert that post-enactment history is the
worst kind of evidence.
140. Of course, the state of Georgia never appeared to defend, fearing that any appearance
could be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity. The justice therefore did not have the
benefit of their argument. Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 419 (“And now Ingersoll, and Dallas, presented to
the Court a written remonstrance and protestation on behalf of the State, against the exercise of
jurisdiction in the cause; but, in consequence of positive instructions, they declined taking any part
in arguing the question.”).
141. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 125, at 550-51.
142. Id. at 554-55.
143. Id. at 549.
144. Cass R. Sunstein & Lawrence Lessig, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 81-82 (1994).
145. Id. at 79-81.
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VI. FALLACIES OF NARRATION
Narration is one of the more common forms historians use to tell
stories.146 Although there are many elements to narration, the one involving
the most common errors is the element of “time and temporal integrity.”147
Most errors in legal histories similarly involve, not surprisingly, the element
of time.
A. FALLACY OF ANACHRONISM
Fischer argues that the fallacy of anachronism underlies most of the
more specific fallacies of narration.148 The fallacy consists in the
“description, analysis, or judgment of an event as if it occurred at some
point in time other than when it actually happened.”149 There are many
kinds of anachronisms with which most of us should be familiar. One
particularly insidious kind is judging a period by an atemporal standard.
Fischer uses an example of an historian, Leonard Levy, who had criticized
Thomas Jefferson for being unlibertarian.150 Yet, as Fischer writes,
Levy formed in his own mind an idea of what civil liberties should
entail—an idea which has some relevance in some of its particulars
to some of Jefferson’s associates . . . . Then he proceeded to
condemn Jefferson, sometimes explicitly, sometimes by innuendo,
for not living up to this exalted atemporal standard. In short, Levy
analyzed and evaluated Jefferson by measuring his acts and
attitudes against the standards of the ACLU and tallying all the
discrepancies. The result is objectionable not merely because it is
unfair to Jefferson but also because it distorts and falsifies the
texture of Jeffersonian thought.151
The socialist historian E.P. Thompson alluded to a fallacy of this sort when
he famously described the “enormous condescension of posterity.”152
An example of the fallacy of anachronism occurs in the article State
Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are Really Deeply
Rooted in American History and Tradition?153 The authors seek to
146. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 131.
147. Id. at 132.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 132-33.
150. Id. at 133.
151. Id. at 134.
152. EDWARD P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 12 (1963).
153. Steven G. Calabresi et. al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual
Rights Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451
(2012)
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determine which rights were “really deeply rooted” at the founding by
exploring state bills of rights in 1787 and 1791.154 In their tables
cataloguing a variety of rights they are investigating, they include “Blaine
Clauses.”155 The failed federal Blaine Amendment and its successful state
counterparts sought to bar public funds to private individuals for use at a
religious school or organization.156 They resulted from Protestant agitation
against private Catholic schools.157 The first state equivalent was passed in
1854,158 and the federal Blaine Amendment was introduced in 1875 and
narrowly defeated in 1876.159 Why would the authors even look for any
such amendments in 1787? Doing so is a completely a-historical and
fruitless enterprise.
But what the authors conclude from this exercise is not just fruitless but
also, I think, erroneous. They write,
There were some clauses bearing on religion that were
surprisingly not present at the time of the founding. We found no
clauses pertaining to witness qualification on the basis of religion,
no clauses mandating a legislative duty to protect religion, no bans
on religious qualifications for holding office; and no Blaine
Amendment provisions forbidding any taxpayer money from ever
going to any institution including a school under sectarian control.
The total absence of Blaine Amendment provisions at the founding
is striking because it reemphasizes the extent to which those
provisions are likely a product of nineteenth century anti-Catholic,
anti-immigrant biases.160
The lack of Blaine Amendments at that time surely tells us absolutely
nothing about the causes of their passage when they actually occurred 60–
100 years later. In itself, this tells us nothing more than does pointing out
that there were no equivalents to the Blaine amendments in 1572 or 1627 in
France—in which case, we learn that the amendments have nothing to do
with an aversion to French Huguenots. We now see the problem: It would
be an arduous task to list all the moments in history in which there were no
such amendments so that we may exclude those moments as contributing to
the creation of the amendments.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 1463-64.
156. Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 495 (2003).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 507 n.49.
159. Id. at 509-10.
160. Steven G. Calabresi et. al. supra note 153, at 1477 (footnote omitted).
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To use a more obvious and relevant example, consider if the authors
had searched for state constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage.
They would find none; could they conclude from this “finding” that a belief
in heterosexual marriage was not “really deeply rooted” in 1789? I think
not.161
The fallacy of anachronism occurs in one particularly egregious form
almost every day in both public and scholarly debates over modern
constitutional questions. The fallacy occurs anytime someone asks, “What
would the Founders do?” Or “What would James Madison think?” I
suspect that most scholars who speak and write in these terms do so for
simplicity’s sake.162 Even the professional historians in the Heller amicus
brief could not resist the temptation of making such a claim.163 The
inescapable truth is that we just don’t know. We can only ask questions
such as, what principles did the Founders’ espouse? Then we must do our
best to apply those principles to modern problems. But we cannot claim to
know what they would have done only had they known of our modern
problems. Perhaps the Founders would have changed their minds entirely
about the proper scope of the Fourth Amendment had they framed it against
the backdrop of NSA metadata collection. But it’s fruitless, and
anachronistic, to speculate.
B. FALLACY OF PRESENTISM
The fallacy of presentism is particularly important for originalist
historians. It is a “complex anachronism, in which the antecedent in a
narrative series is falsified by being defined or interpreted in terms of the
consequent.”164 It consists in the “mistaken idea that the proper way to do
history is to prune away the dead branches of the past, and to preserve the
green buds and twigs which have grown into the dark forest of our
contemporary world.”165 Fischer’s examples are of historians who make
161. Another question is whether state constitutions is a place to look to answer the authors’
question in the first place. We might recall that the Framers did not want a Bill of Rights because
they were afraid that by enumerating them, that would imply other fundamental rights (those
deeply rooted ones) might not be protected.
162. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, What Would Hamilton Do?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 259 (2012).
163. Brief of Rakove et al., supra note 64, at 36. They recognize that it “can be tricky to
answer” questions about “what the Founders would think about various aspects of contemporary
life.” Id. And yet they proceed to venture a confident answer on their particular question: “But as
the historians of the Revolutionary era we are confident at least of this: that the authors of the
Second Amendment would be flabbergasted to learn that in endorsing the republican principle of a
well-regulated militia, they were also precluding restrictions on such potentially dangerous
property as firearms . . . .” Id.
164. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 135.
165. Id. at 135.
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the conscious choice to look only to those past threads in history that have
been most influential on the modern world.166
Several examples arise where the author seems unaware that he is
defining the antecedent in terms of the consequent. An example occurs in
the dissent in Printz v. United States. To bolster his argument that the state
officers engaged in federal executive functions and thus the Constitution
contemplated a commandeering power, Justice Stevens wrote, “[T]he First
Congress enacted legislation requiring state courts to serve, functionally,
like contemporary regulatory agencies in certifying the seaworthiness of
vessels.”167 Such agencies are part of the modern executive branch. More
specifically, Stevens argued, “The statute sets forth, in essence, procedures
for an expert inquisitorial proceeding, supervised by a judge but otherwise
more characteristic of executive activity.”168
Justice Scalia rightly attacks this mode of reasoning: the dissent’s
assertion “is cleverly true—because contemporary regulatory agencies have
been allowed to perform adjudicative (“quasi-judicial”) functions. . . . It is
foolish, however, to mistake the copy for the original, and to believe that
18th-century courts were imitating agencies, rather than 20th-century
agencies imitating courts.”169 In other words, the dissent tried to show that
state judges did executive functions by showing that many of the functions
they performed are today considered executive. But this commits the
fallacy of presentism by defining the antecedent judicial precedent in terms
of the consequent role of executive agencies.
For his part, Justice Scalia commits the same fallacy in the very same
opinion! In response to Justice Souter’s reliance on a passage in The
Federalist that would seem to imply that executive officers—but also state
legislatures—can be commandeered, Scalia wrote that a “problem” with
this “reading is that it makes state legislatures subject to federal
direction.”170 This reading is problematic for Scalia because the Court had
recently held “that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction.”171
Justice Scalia has committed the fallacy of presentism: He has defined the
antecedent (whether commandeering was constitutionally permissible in the
past based on a contemporaneous statement) in terms of a consequent (a
later Supreme Court decision). It is fallacious to conclude that Hamilton’s
166. Id. at 136 (discussing John Herman Randall’s The Making of the Modern Mind); id. at
137 (discussing Bernard Berenson’s Aesthetics and History); id. at 138-39 (discussing Geoffrey
Barraclough’s History in a Changing World).
167. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 950-51 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 951.
169. Id. at 908 n.2 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 912.
171. Id.

198

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:161

statement cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by the dissent merely
because of a holding of the Court nearly two hundred years later. As
Wesley Campbell has written, although Scalia’s statement is true in light of
the subsequent Supreme Court decision, Hamilton’s statement in The
Federalist “would hardly be inconsistent with Hamilton’s views” on
“commandeering of state legislatures.”172
The fallacy occurs when, in Alden v. Maine’s predecessor case
Seminole Tribe,173 the dissent colored its view of sovereign immunity at the
founding—the antecedent—with the particular conception of sovereign
immunity in the Eleventh Amendment—a consequent.174 But as Caleb
Nelson has argued, the Eleventh Amendment was written in terms of
subject-matter jurisdiction, possibly for a number of good reasons;
sovereign immunity generally, however, was considered a matter of
personal jurisdiction.175 In the dissent’s version of history, the “antecedent
in a narrative series is falsified by being defined or interpreted in terms of
the consequent,” and thus commits the fallacy of presentism. All of this is
not to say that evidence marshalled by either side was not useful; it’s not to
say that this problem was not amenable to historical resolution; the point is
rather that the evidence would have been much more meaningful if older,
unfamiliar, and forgotten concepts had been unearthed.
Originalists and other legal historians commit a slightly different form
of the fallacy that stems from an inability to see that the past world was
often so different from the contemporary world and that we are myopically
searching only for elements familiar to our modern eyes and ears. The
result is that we often miss those elements directly relevant to the
development of the modern concept over time because they look unfamiliar
in their historical forms. Two examples from the originalist literature, I
think, might display this fallacy at work: the histories of executive power
and of judicial review.
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein may have identified this fallacy in
the work of many unitary executive theorists. They argue that where
modern unitarians see only “executive power” in the Vesting Clause of
Article II, the founding generation understood there to be an “executive”
power and an “administrative” power. This lost distinction would explain
why several clauses in Article II seem redundant today: If the President has
all “executive” power, why must he have the enumerated authority to

172.
173.
174.
175.

Campbell, supra note 88, at 1137 n.135 (emphasis added).
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Id. at 101-02, 109-16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Nelson, supra note 60, at 1602-08.
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demand the opinions of department heads, unless some of those
departments were not purely “executive” in nature? It also explains
Congress’s original distinction between the departments of war and foreign
affairs—to be led by principal officers removable by the President—and the
department of Treasury, led by a department head that was not directly
removable by the President.176 Of course, it may be that they are the ones
committing an anachronism, as Calabresi and Prakash point out, by seeking
in the framers’ understanding a notion of “administrative power” taken
from the nineteenth (or twentieth), not the eighteenth, century.177
Philip Hamburger devotes an entire book purporting to correct the
misconception of judicial review created by the fallacy of presentism in
much of the conventional history on judicial review. This history and its
implications, Hamburger explains, “rest on the fragile assumption that there
is little evidence of judicial review from the decade and a half after 1776”
and before, and so the conventional history concludes “that American
judges must have created this power.”178 More specifically, these histories
conclude that John Marshall is the “founding father of judicial review” and
Marbury v. Madison “its authorizing text.”179
There are variations on this theme, but all essentially agree that the
doctrine seems to have been created by American judges. To cite some
examples, Gordon Wood wrote that it was the reaction to legislative
supremacy in the 1780s that led to a “new appreciation of the role of the
judiciary” and to a “growing recourse to judicial settlement.”180 Elsewhere
he has written that the origins of judicial review “had to flow from
fundamental changes taking place in the Americans’ ideas of government
and law.”181 Jack Rakove argued that it was a “puzzle . . . to understand
how the quarter-century after the adoption of the first state constitutions
made possible so significant a departure in American thinking about the
nature of judicial power,”182 and that “before judicial review could become
legitimate, Americans first had to accept a concept of judicial independence
that they could not have easily formulated, much less endorsed, before the

176. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22-42, 72-73 (1994).
177. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 125, at 567-68.
178. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 1-2 (2008).
179. Id. at 3.
180. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 454
(1969).
181. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court
Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 793 (1999).
182. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1031, 1063 (1997).
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Revolution.”183 Others similarly maintain that the power of judicial review
was nowhere present in the Constitution, and so it had to be invented by
American judges.184
All of these scholars could not find much evidence of judicial review in
the 1780s and 90s, let alone before the Revolution, because they were
looking for a peculiarly modern conception of something which has
subsequently become known as “judicial review.” Yet that is not
necessarily how the founding era’s judges would have thought about their
acts striking down laws as contrary to some higher law. As Hamburger
explains,
[T]he problem is not so much evidentiary as conceptual. The
trouble arises from the very notion of judicial review, which is a
concept so tightly focused on modern concerns that it renders
many of the early decisions almost irrelevant. If judicial review is
today considered prototypically a review of legislation, then early
decisions about executive and judicial acts do not appear very
central. Similarly, if judicial review is associated with cases, then
other types of decisions, such as resolutions and advisory opinions,
seem anomalous.185
Once we recognize the terms and context in which judges in the
eighteenth century would have understood their actions—in the terms of
judicial duty rather than review—Hamburger argues that all of the
evidentiary problems evaporate. All of a sudden, judicial review is merely
one component of a robust tradition of deciding cases in accord with a
certain duty which, even though it usually did not include striking down
legislative acts, took but a mere extension to encompass judicial “review”
of legislation. “With this conceptual adjustment,” writes Hamburger, “what
was previously little more than an evocative blur becomes an expansive and
well-defined landscape, filled with vivid details. The evidence . . . thus
requires a change in paradigm—a return from the modern notion of judicial
review back to the old, forgotten ideal of judicial duty.”186
Hamburger demonstrates throughout his book how English judges had
a duty to act in accord with the law of the land, a duty which led them often
to strike down custom inconsistent with common law,187 corporate acts
inconsistent with corporate charters,188 royal acts inconsistent with the “law
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1034.
See HAMBURGER, supra note 178, at 10-11 (quoting and citing sources).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 185.
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of the land,”189 acts of a single house of parliament,190 and occasionally
colonial acts.191 A vocal minority even believed that acts of parliament
could be thus declared unconstitutional.192 “There was no need[, therefore,]
for an American development of a new judicial power, let alone a
revolutionary creation of such a power, for the ideals of law and judicial
duty endured within the framework of the common law.”193 It was this
notion of “judicial duty” that “gave Americans a formal mechanism for
enforcing constitutional law against all parts of government.”194
If Hamburger is right, he has identified a kind of fallacy of presentism
in the literature. The historians who claim that judicial review was a radical
departure or innovation, or something invented by Marshall or by American
judges in the 1780s and 90s, miss the broader picture because they are
looking for something modern—a concept of judicial “review” of
legislative acts—that was in fact but a small and necessary extension of a
much broader concept of law that no longer resonates to modern ears.
C. FALLACY OF TUNNEL HISTORY
The fallacy of tunnel history consists in “‘split[ting] the past into a
series of tunnels, each continuous from the remote past to the present, but
practically self-contained at every point and sealed off from contact with or
contamination by anything that was going on in any of the other tunnels.”195
It might manifest, for example, in the idea that everything can be explained
by economic history, or by military history, or by political history, without
understanding that these “tunnels” are not in fact self-contained. Believing
otherwise can lead to the commission of numerous fallacies, such as
fallacies of factual significance or question-framing.
Tunnel history is not the same thing as proving what you set out to
prove because of your precommitments; but one manifestation of tunnel
history is defining something as essentially one thing or another because of
an unwillingness to see many threads in history interact. We can think of
numerous constitutional theorists who seem to believe that the Constitution
is a representation of only one particular historical thread. The view that

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
(1961).

Id. at 194.
Id. at 215.
See id. at 235-36, 255-61.
Id. at 250-54.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 394.
FISCHER, supra note 1, at 142 (quoting J.H. HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY 194
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the Constitution represents essentially Lockean liberalism,196 or the view
that the Constitution represents essentially classical republicanism,197 or the
view that the Constitution is an overwhelmingly democratic, processoriented document,198 all come to mind.
VII. FALLACIES OF GENERALIZATION
All historians generalize. To ask whether a historian should generalize
is as silly, writes Fischer, as asking whether he should use words.199
Nevertheless, generalizations are often abused.
Fischer defines a
generalization as a statement “of statistical regularity,” or a “descriptive
statement which is inferred from particular facts by a special process of
reasoning” that “explains what, how, when, where, and who,” though often
not why.200 The fallacies of generalizations that historians commonly
commit “consist in a confusion of quantitative and impressionistic
procedures”; they are all “procedural errors, by which false inferences are
derived from true particulars.”201 We shall see that originalist historians are
not immune from these fallacies. But the important point to remember is
that all historians commit them, and so all historians can become better by
avoiding them—including originalist historians.
A. FALLACY OF STATISTICAL SAMPLING
A fallacy of statistical sampling occurs in generalizations “which rest
upon an insufficient body of data—upon a ‘sample’ which misrepresents
the composition of the object in question.”202 We might guess that this
fallacy is particularly relevant to originalist historians because they tend to
focus on just what a few Federalists thought. To be sure, there is some
justification for doing so, if we believe that what these few Federalists
thought were likely to reflect or to influence what intelligent readers of the
period thought. Thus, focusing on what these Federalists thought could be
consistent with a theory of originalism that centers on the understanding of
a hypothetical reasonable and knowledgeable observer.203 This focus might
be less meaningful for an originalism that centers on the original public
196. See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014).
197. WOOD, supra note 180, at 426-29 (1969).
198. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
199. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 103.
200. Id. at 104.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 104-05.
203. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003) (making the case that the
notes from the Constitutional Convention are relevant to this version of originalism).
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meaning, however—a meaning that does not assume reasonable and
knowledgeable observers but rather actual people with actual
understandings.204 For that theory, the evidence from the ratifying
conventions is much more likely to be important. Of course, when it comes
to more impressionistic points—such as the general principles and aims of
the Constitution—what a few Federalists thought might be more important.
So long as one is clear on what one is seeking to answer, and on the
limitations of the evidence, it may not be unreasonable to rely on what just
a few Founders thought. But this practice might occasionally, and
unsurprisingly, be abused.205 This fallacy must be avoided meticulously
because critics of originalism often charge its proponents with cherrypicking facts to suit their particular legal agendas.
B. FALLACY OF THE LONELY FACT
The fallacy of the lonely fact is an extension of the previous fallacy but
“deserves to receive special condemnation.”206 “It may be defined as a
statistical generalization from a single case.”207 We can use the same
example from before: making broad generalizations from the views of a
single founder. There are many accounts of executive power, especially
from the conservative perspective, that depend very heavily (though not

204. Cf. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 724
(2011).
205. Martin Flaherty gives us some possible examples of poor generalization from the
originalist literature:
[C]onstitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions that are at best deeply
problematic and at worst, howlers. Robert Bork’s The Tempting of America is filled
with authoritative historical conclusions yet cites scarcely any primary or, for that
matter, secondary sources. Paul Kahn, in a study entitled Legitimacy and History,
boldly divides American constitutional thought into six successive “models of
construction,” but does so on the basis of few primary works for any given period and
with scant reference to secondary literature. . . . The illustrations could go on. The
point of most (though not all) of them is not that the particular assertion may or may
not be tenable. Rather, it is that habits of poorly supported generalization—which at
times fall below even the standards of undergraduate history writing—pervade the
work of many of the most rigorous theorists when they invoke the past to talk about
the Constitution.
Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
523, 525-26 (1995) (footnotes omitted). Jesse H. Choper, to add another example, argues based
only on The Federalist that “the assertion that federalism was meant to protect, or does in fact
protect, individual constitutional freedoms . . . has no solid historical or logical basis.” Id. at 526
n.15 (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 244
(1980)).
206. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 109.
207. Id.
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necessarily exclusively) on the views of Alexander Hamilton.208 But the
liberals commit this fallacy, too. At least two scholars, for example, have
relied solely on Federalist No. 77 as a “refutation” of a Hamiltonian unitary
executive theory because Hamilton seems to say that displacing Federal
officers would require the approval of the Senate.209
This fallacy is not committed just by originalists; it can be committed
by all legal thinkers who use history to make an argument. Ronald
Dworkin was no exception. In Law’s Empire, he claimed that the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to desegregate
schools; his evidence is a single statement from the floor manager of the
1866 Civil Rights Act.210 Originalist historians and judges should be
particularly careful to avoid this fallacy of the lonely fact.
C. FALLACY OF STATISTICAL SPECIAL PLEADING
The fallacy of special pleading is a particularly insidious fallacy. It
“occurs whenever an investigator applies a double standard of inference or
interpretation to his evidence—one standard to evidence which sustains his
generalization and another to evidence which contradicts it.”211 Fischer
offers an example in David Donald’s The Politics of Reconstruction,212 in
which the author tried to argue that Republicans in safe districts tended to
be radical and those in competitive districts tended to be moderate.213 The
problem was that the evidence showed that both moderate and radical
republicans won elections by nearly identical margins (about 59 percent).214
Donald, however,
proceeded to “interpret” his evidence until it conformed to his
hypothesis. He argued that in some states, where there was an
allegedly powerful Republican organization, a majority of 52
percent was security itself for a radical, but that in another state, a
majority of 58 percent was too small to serve the same purpose.

208. See, e.g., John Yoo, Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1935, 1976-85,
1992-96 (2009); cf. Bailey, supra note 127, at 170 (describing Hamilton as the father of the
unitary executive).
209. David M. Driesen, Toward A Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 71, 101-04 (2009); Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 607, 621-22 (2009).
210. Flaherty, supra note 205, at 526 n.15 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 360
(1986)).
211. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 110.
212. DAVID DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1867 (1965).
213. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 111.
214. Id. at 111-12.
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One qualification was heaped upon another with an industry and
an ingenuity which were worthy of a better cause.215
One example arises in a different amicus brief in Heller. In the Brief
for Professors of Linguistics and English, the linguistics professors seem to
explain away usages of the phrase “to bear arms” when not used in a
military context and apply a different standard when analyzing those
occurrences in a military context. They write:
Examples of the idiomatic usage of “bear arms” during the time
of the founding abound. In each instance where “bear arms” (or
“bearing arms” or “bear arms against”) is used without additional
language modifying the phrase, it is unquestionably used in its
ordinary idiomatic [military] sense. It is only in usages where
additional specifying language is added, such as “bear arms for the
defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or
for the purpose of killing game,” that any intent to bend, even
change (in the case of killing game), the idiom is apparent.
For example, the Declaration of Independence denounces the
British monarch for “constrain[ing] our fellow Citizens taken
Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country.” No
one doubts that “bear Arms against” in that passage means “to be
engaged in hostilities with.” In a later echo, Thomas Jefferson, as
Secretary of State, wrote in dissent from advice by Alexander
Hamilton and Henry Knox to President Washington . . . : “[A]nd if
the suggestion be true . . . it is equally true that more than ten times
that number of Americans are at this moment on board English
ships of war, who have been taken forcibly from our merchant
vessels, at sea or in port wherever met with, & compelled to bear
arms against the friends of their country.”216
A suspicious special pleading has occurred here. The linguists explain
away other usages of “to bear arms” by claiming that those other examples
are qualified or modified by “additional specifying language,” such as bear
arms for the defense of themselves or for the purpose of killing game. And
yet they refuse to apply this same “additional specifying language” standard
to the use of the phrase that they prefer: bearing arms against the state or
against an enemy. Only these latter examples have military connotations;
yet they are equally modified by “additional specifying language,” namely,
215. Id. at 112.
216. Brief for Professors of Linguistics & English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D. et al. in Support of
Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157194,
at 20-21 (citations omitted).
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against the state or against an enemy. After all, the Second Amendment
does not say, “the right of the citizens to keep and bear arms against . . . .”
Why the military uses modified by “against” are the “ordinary” usage,
whereas only the non-military uses contain “additional specifying
language,” is unclear. The linguists have committed the fallacy of special
pleading.
VIII. SOME LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This article has shown throughout that certain methodological errors
commonly occur in originalist literature and judicial opinions of all political
persuasions. History is not easy to do properly, but if originalists avoid
these errors, then valuable and correct historical conclusions are possible. I
have not meant to suggest that any particular judges or scholars will have to
revise their ultimate conclusions on sovereign immunity, commandeering,
judicial review, the Second Amendment, and the like, but that their
reasoning would be significantly improved by correcting the existing errors
pointed out here. Sometimes historical conclusions might even change as a
result.
This article has also aimed to show, then, that criticisms of “law office
history” are overblown. It is true that when litigants use history they will
often use it selectively to aid their clients. But that does not mean that
judges and academics cannot arrive at correct historical answers using
proper methodologies. It also does not mean that professional historians are
immune from the problems they denounce. As we have seen, even
professional historians have committed numerous historians’ fallacies in
their own briefs to the courts. But it would be preposterous to suggest that
historians should not do history.
David Hackett Fischer’s whole point was that historians frequently
commit certain errors, and modern historians and originalists are no
different. But these errors can be avoided with practice. Although a much
more extensive analysis would be required to demonstrate this proposition,
I suspect as well that originalists need little more to become better and more
useful historians. The skills necessary to be a good historian—critical
thinking, analogical reasoning, proper evidentiary weighing—are skills that
lawyers and judges use every day. Judges weigh sources for credibility and
relevance all the time. If lawyers cannot do history merely because we are
not historians, then I wonder whether we really can do this thing called
“law” at all. Further, irrespective of the great debate among professional
historians over historiography and historical methods, the relationship
between, for example, the Eleventh Amendment and Chisolm cannot be
disputed no matter what historical methodology one adopts. With no
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offense intended to professional historians, it would seem that judges and
lawyers need not commit to any particular side of the methodological
debates to come up with historical answers useful to at least some questions
relevant to the law.
In sum, if lawyers can and should do history, then there is nothing
missing from their toolkit other than a guide of common methodological
errors, which it has been the aim of this article to supply.

